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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-v-
DAVID - » ^E SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 19283 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing «:>£ an opinion filed by the 
Utah Supreme Court on September 16, 1986. (A copy of that opinion, 
State v. Smith, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, is contained in Addendum A.) 
Originally this case was an appeal from a conviction and judgment 
imposed for Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, and Theft, a Third 
Degree Felony, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer P. Wilkinson, 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at 2 and 
i n
 State v, Smith, 4 2 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. 
INTRODUCTION 
1 n
 Browi I v Pickard , denying reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated the standard for the granting of a 
petition for rehearing: "To justify a rehearing, a strong case must 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be made. We must be convinced that the court failed to consider 
some material point in the case, or that it erred in its 
conclusions, . . . ." In Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P.619 at 624 
(Utah 1913), the Court declared: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions for 
rehearings in proper cases. When this court, 
however, has considered and decided all of the 
material questions involved in a case, a 
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some material 
fact or facts, or have overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong principle 
of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result . . 
. . If there are some reasons, however, such as 
we have indicated above, or other good reasons, a 
petition for a rehearing should be promptly filed 
and, if it is meritorious, its form will in no 
case be scrutinized by this court. 
The argument section of this brief will establish that, applying 
these standards, the Appellant's petition for rehearing is properly 
before the Court and should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING 
THE DISPUTED JURY INSTRUCTION IN THIS CASE 
AND THE RESULT OF THIS CASE DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS 
THIS COURTfS HOLDING IN STATE V. PACHECO 
In his opening brief, Mr. Smith challenged the trial 
court's giving of instruction No. 20 (R.lll). Over Smith's 
objection, the trial judge instructed the jury: 
Utah Law provides that: 
"Possession of property recently stolen when 
no satisfactory explanation of such possession is 
-2-
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made, shall be prima facie evidence that the 
person in possession stole the property." 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was 
in possession of stolen property, that such 
possession of stolen property, that such 
possession was not too remote in point of time 
from the theft, and the defendant made no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession, then 
you may infer from those facts that the defendant 
committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if you find 
it justified by the evidence, to connect the 
possessor of recently stolen property with the 
offense of burglary. 
The first full paragraph of the instruction contains the language of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) (1953, as amended), while the remainder 
of the instruction explains the statutory language. 
A. INSTRUCTION NUMBER 20 WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
MANDATORY REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION. 
In upholding Instruction No. 20, this Court held that, when 
read "in light of its immediate context and the context of the 
instructions as a whole," the jury in the case could not "have 
reasonably applied the instructions in an unconstitutional manner." 
State v. Smith, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 at 16. The Court concluded 
that the instruction created only a permissible inference and was 
therefore allowable. In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
stated: 
Lest there be a misunderstanding of our ruling in 
this case, we emphatically declare that we do not 
retreat from [State v. Chambers]. The trial 
court should not have used the statutory language 
in the instruction for the reasons stated in 
Chambers. We hold only that the instruction 
cannot be deemed reversible error in this case in 
light of the clear explanatory instructions . . . 
Smith at 16. In fact, the conclusion reached in this case stands in 
direct contradiction to the conclusion of State v. Chambers, 709 
P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) and subsequent cases. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Chambers, this Court unequivocally stated: 
We therefore conclude that a jury instruction 
using the language of U.C.A., 1953, §76-6-402(1) 
is unconstitutional because it directly relates 
to the issue of guilt and relieves the State of 
its burden of proof. . . . Thus, the statutory 
language should not be used in any form in 
instructing juries in criminal cases, . . . . 
Id. at 327 (emphasis added). Despite this clear prohibition on the 
use of the statutory language, in this case the Court upholds an 
instruction which used exactly the prohibited language. 
The basis for the prohibition on the use of the statutory 
language in Chambers was that the Court found that the language 
formed a mandatory rebuttable presumption. The Court noted that the 
United States Supreme Court found the use of such presumptions 
unconstitutional in Francis v. Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 
344 (1985). The Chambers Court stated that instructions containing 
mandatory rebuttable presumptions were unconstitutional because such 
instructions relieved the State of its burden of proof and shifted 
that burden to the defendant. 709 P.2d at 325, 326. Despite the 
use of the same statutory language as in Chambers, which presumably 
created the same burden-shifting as in Chambers, the Court in this 
case concluded that Instruction No. 20 created only a "permissive 
inference." 
The Court reached this conclusion because of the language 
of the remainder of Instruction No. 20 and the language of 
Instruction No. 23 which stated: 
The mere fact that a person was in conscious 
possession of recently stolen property is not 
sufficient to justify a conviction of theft. 
There must be proof of other circumstances 
tending of themselves to establish guilt. 
However, such proof need not be established by 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
add It 101 lal evidei ice or witnesses If you. fir id that 
the possession occurred under circumstances which 
warrants a finding of guilty. In this connection 
you may consider the defendant's conduct, any 
false or contradictory statements, and any other 
statements the defendant may have made with 
reference to the property. If the defendant 
gives a false account of how he acquired 
possession of stolen property this is a 
circumstance that may tend to show guilt. 
: .- absence of evidence as to why *ih~ 
defendant: was in possession of recently stolen 
property, you may infer that the defendant stole 
the propert;-
( " • masoned ujcr :r ^t\* f * L n? - ' lotions were 
Cons id- :,'i ..^ dii.cir ^ "jurv re,,: . )^[:.,r 
instruction . • n :uns t 1t.:~ i • ^ •*" r- *- -. 'Jta: \ v;. Rep. at 
16. T *. * i *• * * 7^ arj^ ji.±. -a which this 
Court declared: 
Fjrther, a J though Mere wa. ano:her instruction 
jiven, instruction No. 25, which restated the 
presumption in permissive form, the additional 
instruction failed to cure the defect. "Language 
that merely contradicts and does not explain a 
constitutionally infirm instruction A/*;: n r 
suffice to absolve the infirmity.* 
Taraf a, *.\) ', _ : U>t * . •*- . *•- ; : *.\szc~: creai 
mandate- oresumrt; m whi."h ino*- ^ r .struetion restated m 
As in State v. Chambers where the challenged 
instruction v/as restated in permissive form, the 
•idoi *• lonal instruction fails to cure the defect, 
A.ny reasonable jurcr could have been left 
. . -a quandary as to whetnet to follow the 
so-called explanatory instruction r^ the 
immediately preceding ryr. • — * *- r id i cted . 
720 P,2a -r ' *"* * * * f .^ i-n-.- ^
 m 
p r e s e n t e r ,vit.\ ^ ; r r idi ct.:r / * c ^ i i , ng n s t r u c t i : r -• i s 
u n c l e . i i 
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instructions which transform the statutory mandatory rebuttable 
presumption into a permissive inference result in affirmance here 
but reversal in Chambers and Tarafa. 
Another factor is present in this case which also 
contributed to the reversal in Tarafa, Here, as in Tarafa, the 
prosecutor emphasized the mandatory nature of the presumption. In 
closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 
Now the question then becomes one of whether 
we have a burglary. You have been instructed by 
the Judge if a burglary occurs and someone is 
found with the property in his possession, he may 
within a short period of time, it is called not 
too remote a time period from the time of the 
burglary until the time of possession, that you 
can infer that he committed the burglary. And 
taking it one step further that you can also 
infer that he committed the theft. This being 
the time period that the law provides that if you 
are going to have stolen property in your 
possession, and it is going to be right close to 
the time it was stolen, we can assume that you 
stole it. Unless you have a satisfactory 
explanation. 
(R.419-420). In Tarafa the Court concluded that the prosecutor!s 
statements in closing argument concerning the mandatory nature of 
the presumption could have easily contributed to the jury's 
confusion about the instructions. 720 P.2d at 1371, n.16. The same 
confusion must have been present in this case because the prosecutor 
emphasized not the permissive character of the instructions but 
rather their mandatory nature (if you have stolen property, "we can 
assume you stole it." [R.420]). In this respect, this case is 
indistinguishable from Tarafa. 
In summary, Instruction No. 20 given to the jury in this 
case contains the language of U.C.A. §76-6-402(1) which this Court 
in Chambers stated "should not be used in any form in instructing 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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explain wny subsequ«-*r i rj^ , r t i^  i< »u- *-. L . r r -t r - * i ^ mann-i . i . 
presumption n n^rm s ss i b 1 ^  form r^soie r.h-* ^ h a lleng^o jury 
* *"
T !
 * i.Lii,,fc/^j • —*c d ^ " * H additional 
instructions fai - ^ u r ^ rh«- let^o- • • , *-ier. j--i 
ins t r u *""*• : *>n * - * - a n - n i - . : i *• * 3" I * • i na' 1 y , 11 e 
pros»rc . : • - resorption 
must h JV^ ronfused ;*. -^re is . , Jii
 x n Urat ^  iv:ause : 
these tac^r^, *•* ° ,roiv! • * <: -lis ci^e rannnt-
 K-<- reconciled witr *:.e 
results : ^nameer _- a . ; _: _?«__*_. - , . - - , 
B. THE RESULT IN :iiiS CASE IS IN 
DIRECT OPPOSITION TO STATE 
V. PACHECO, WHICH CONTAINED 
A VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL INSTRUCTTOM, 
Appellant or;i\ • * - : io ; - i 
granted .n :,i3 jcise because t^e ;ou-\ls -pinion netj - s iA:ec:l/ 
c - - -^JLIJL: p.fLiIi?*£:i' 712 p*2d 1 9 2 (Utah 
l-»d? ) , '-.',' o .ie- c . : 
The op.nion : n PdCheco was filer: *Ne same day as State v, 
C.idi;ioc, , - • . ~( ; luiue similar to tha* c; ?e*; .^n 
Chamber c ."; Pacneco t je o" J-.JI: :L\« - r e s u m p t : JT\ ten HI1! 'i 
§ 7 6 — 6 — 4 0 2 ( ; • wa. i:--n . :> y : c : in.---rue* i.on reiati i : t - - defendant 
t .. : *^ ar ^aM - ^ j f re ,.v^Pd *• *;c 
c o n v i c t i o n . n 1 A ;jfOv oeniub' •* er,cr; 
stia^u: ..': o r e s u m p t s r - -i^r;, " . r r ?he Pacheco Court relied 
;*..;. - .>J/I*>- ,. a cne cases milieu therein in 
reach.: no its uei-j-sion 
- 7-
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In Pacheco, Instruction No. 15 read:1 
The law of the State of Utah provides as 
follows: 
"Possession of property 
recently stolen, when no satis-
factory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be prima 
facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property." 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, (I) that the defendant 
was in possession of property, (II) that the 
property was stolen in a burglary, (III) that 
such possession was not too remote in point of 
time from the burglary, and (IV) that the 
defendant had made no satisfactory explanation of 
such possession, then you may find from those 
facts that the defendant committed the burglary 
in which such property was stolen and stole the 
property. 
(source: State's Petition for Rehearing in State v. Pacheco at 
4)(Addendum B) (emphasis added). In this case Instruction No. 20 
stated: 
Utah Law provides that: 
"Possession of property recently stolen 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be prima facie 
evidence that the person in possession stole 
the property." 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was 
in possession of stolen property, that such 
possession was not too remote in point of time 
from the theft, and the defendant made no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession, then 
you may infer from those facts that the defendant 
committed the theft. 
"*"• Instruction No. 15, given jjn toto here, was never reproduced in 
its entirety in the opinion in State v. Pacheco. 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
You may .,., .m. ._uirit * .J. *= r enc*-, ,. yuu : ind 
IL justified by the evidence, to connect tn-j 
possessor of recently stolen property w,tr ^ 
offence ^f ^nrqlary. 
fp.lll^ (eiDphasi- added;, *ven a r^r^ory comparison revea.3 tnat 
the nst ructions a r ^ n e a r ! / ld^n* i oa i , B o t h i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e a 
v e E * . : . - . * " e 
e x p l a n a t i o n s cr tne s t d ^ u u t ; . . a n a u a ^ , ^ut\- . ns t ru ct iu r^ 
e x p l a r n ^ ' ^ n s req-.i r^ ^ i W ^ f ; t o f v - , c ^ o n d a r easo^ac.! - ioufat, 
tha~ ** : - ! - - ' 'Ub.v:b3. • s •- I m * ii i t 
g i v i n g a * at i s f ac t o r y e x p l a n a t i o n , If t he u L y l. i ncs t n e s e 
n ,,, _ . . n p r e d i c a t e f a ^ ' s , *h^n Uoc, i n s t r u c t i o n s s t a t e t h a t t - v jt:ry "^[av 
f„na r.:,;:i rnu^e ; - .-* s i r-^ - j - : - : . i •:•• • • t , • -:c 
q u e s t i o n . 
^ s - r i c t i o n No. r . Pache^o r e s t a t e s "v^ I -noua^e '^ f tne 
s t a t u t - n p e r m i s s i v e form i,- 31 J • : . 
Yet. t h e P_ache_cq i n f r a c t j^n .vac : ;un i inc t ns 111 a t lor a . * n * . e the 
1 -. ^ The r e s u l t s o i che Lwo c a s e s 
.•a* ; V.,JKI * , - jmpa z L:A& * 
I t s J - . 
a r e c l e a t i i 
The o p n i v . t n i s cas^ n» ' ^ s * nat a n c t h e . I n s t r x C t i c , 
number I „ n I -;o < Miiphas I ZHS MIIH p e r m i s s i v e c h a r a c t e r of the i n f e r e n c e 
of g u i l t c r e a t e d by I n s t r u c t i o n iln, 'il -iiiii th a t l n ^ i I Si ' io^ 1 
o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s s r -- ment ioned • the Pacheco o p i n i o n , one may 
a r ^ . ' . ^ ' i ' . "he.? t h - t - ^ a ? e s . However, in i t s 
P e t i t i o n t :: ^ e t t ' d / j - . bMcneco , , v e ::' a t e urged ih^., i.1 m l 1 o 
c o n s i d e r -1' l e a s t four ,»tr.er i n s t r u c t i o n s caive . . 3 -e as 
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ameliorating the defect in the challenged instruction. (Addendum B 
at 7-9). By denying that Petition for Rehearing, the Court rejected 
the very argument which is now used to rationalize the decision in 
this case. 
One final, practical factor must be considered with respect 
to Pacheco. Since the Instruction No. 20 given in this case and 
Instruction No. 15 in Pacheco are virtually identical, practitioners 
and trial courts are left in a quandary by the two opinions. The 
Pacheco instruction was declared unconstitutional while the 
nearly-identical instruction in this case was upheld. Practitioners 
and trial courts will be hard-pressed to discern which instructions 
are allowable and which are defective. Indeed, the Court seems to 
be drawing lines so fine that they are impossible to perceive. 
In summary, Instruction No. 20 which was upheld in this 
case is virtually identical to Instruction No. 15 which was struck 
down in Pacheco. The argument that was used to uphold this 
instruction (that other instructions tended to cure any defect) was 
rejected by this Court in Pacheco. No rational explanation can be 
advanced to allow both opinions to co-exist. The decision in this 
case is clearly contradictory to Pacheco and should be 
reconsidered. 
POINT II. INSTRUCTIONS 20 AND 23 COMBINED TO FORCE 
THE DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY IN VIOLATION OF 
HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 
In his opening brief, Appellant Smith argued that the 
statutory presumption as manifested in the jury instructions forced 
him to testify in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The 
-10-
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opinion in this case relies on several cases to defeat this 
argument. However, careful examination of the primary cases cited 
by the Court shows that they are distinguishable from the present 
case. 
Instruction No. 20, supra at 3, clearly stated that the 
defendant himself was required to give a satisfactory explanation of 
his possession of recently stolen property. Instruction No. 23 
(Addendum C) continued to keep the focus on the defendant by 
allowing the jury to reach the statutory presumption by simply 
disbelieving the defendant's explanation or finding it 
contradictory. 
The opinion in this case relies on Barnes v. United States, 
412 U.S. 837 (1973) to defeat Mr. Smith's claim. However, in Barnes 
the instruction given to the jury did not require an explanation 
directly from the defendant. In Barnes, the defendant's possession 
of recently stolen property could simply be explained by "facts and 
circumstances in [the] case which are in some way consistent with 
the defendant's innocence." 512 U.S. at 840, n.3. No direct 
testimony from the defendant was required. 
State v. Chambers, supra, also cited by the Court in this 
case, presented a similar question. However, as in Barnes, the 
Chambers Court stated: "Nothing in the instruction required 
testimony by defendants, because an explanation of possession could 
have been made by the testimony of other witnesses or by other 
evidence." 709 P.2d at 325. 
The distinction between Barnes and Chambers and this case 
is subtle but important. As noted above, neither the Barnes nor the 
-11-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Chambers instructions required the defendant to testify. In those 
cases a "reasonable explanation" of possession of recently stolen 
property could emanate from any source, including the State's 
witnesses. However, Instruction No. 20 in this case specifically 
required that the defendant himself provide the explanation of 
possession. According to the instruction, if the defendant did not 
testify, the jury was virtually bound to enter a verdict of guilt. 
Such a result clearly violates the protections secured by the Fifth 
Amendment. Because the cases cited by the Court in support of its 
opinion are distinguishable and because of the uniqueness of the 
instruction in this case, which could be satisfied only by the 
defendant's testimony, a rehearing should be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the opinion in this case misapplied State v. 
Chambers and State v. Tarafa and erroneously applied Barnes v. 
United States and because the opinion in this case is in direct 
conflict with State v. Pacheco, the Appellant, David Tyrone Smith, 
respectfully petitions this court to reconsider its decision and 
reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial or 
dismissal of the charges. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ff^day of October, 1986. 
C-~UAJ6L4< (2 • ^ e ^ ^ e ^ 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Petitioner 
-12-
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I hereby certify that I delivered four copies of the 
foregoing to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ^0^ day of October, 
1986. 
y^e^t^r 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATION 
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for appellant/petitioner in this 
case and; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this f>& ^ day of October, 1986. 
C^*^<-^ C. y^z^jzj-* 
CURTIS C. NESSET ^ 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The STATE of Utah, ?r 
Plaintiff and Respondent,
 f 
v. • « . . • • 
David Tyrone SMITH, 
Defendant and Appellant. , 
No. 19283 ' , . . " ; ; • 
FILED: September 16, 1986 
THIRD DISTRICT ,, 
Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson j .. 
ATTORNEYS: 
David L. Wilkinson, J. Stephen Mikita, 
Thomas D. Vuyk for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
Connie L. Mower for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The appellant, David Tyrone Smith, was 
convicted by a jury of burglary and theft, 
both third degree felonies. On appeal he 
argues: (1) U.C.A., 1953, §76-6-402 establ-
ishes an unconstitutional presumption that 
one in possession of recently stolen property 
is guilty of having stolen it and that that 
presumption is not constitutionally sufficient 
by itself to support a guilty verdict; (2) his 
wife should not have been permitted to testify 
against him over his objection; (3) he was 
forced to testify to rebut the presumption 
- contained in §76-6-402 in violation of his 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Fifth Amendment right not to testify; and (4) 
other prejudicial evidence was admitted 
against him. We affirm. 
Smith was charged with burglary and the 
theft of a saxophone worth $850 which belo-
nged to LaRae Francis, who stored it in an 
apartment house in a locked basemenl 
storage unit assigned to her sister, Annette 
Nielsen. Sometime between December 24, 
1982, when Nielsen last visited the storage 
unit, and December 27, 1982, the day the 
saxophone was pawned, someone broke into 
the unit and stole the saxophone. Smith lived 
nearby. His wife Tonia was staying with a 
friend in the same apartment complex occu-
pied by Nielsen, where Smith visited her 
several times. 
At trial, Jennifer Kearns, a supervisor at 
St. Mark's, where Smith lived, testified that 
she saw the defendant at St. Mark's with the 
saxophone. He told her that the saxophone 
was his and that he had used it at a perform-
ance the previous weekend. She testified that 
Smith made no attempt to hide the instru-
ment or to be evasive about it during the 
conversation. Kearns could not precisely date 
the conversation. However, Smith admitted 
the conversation and testified that it occurred 
on the morning of December 27, 1982. 
Another supervisor, Tom Webb, testified that i 
sometime, probably shortly after Christmas, 
he noticed a saxophone in a case in the St. 
Mark's main office with a piece of paper 
attached somewhere near the top bearing 
Smith's full name. The supervisor identified 
the saxophone by a round white seal on the 
case which he remembered seeing when the 
saxophone was in the office. He also was 
unable to pinpoint the date any more exactly. 
Belinda Williams, a friend of both Smith 
and his wife, Tonia, testified that on Dece-
mber 27 Tonia called her and asked her to 
pawn something for her. She said Tonia told 
her that she needed money. When Williams 
picked Tonia up a few minutes later, Tonia 
directed her to go to Smith's place to pick up 
something that he was going to let her pawn. 
Williams did not know what was to be 
pawned until Tonia went into St. Mark's and 
returned with the saxophone. At first, Tonia 
indicated that she wanted Williams to pawn a 
ring. After they arrived at the pawn shop, 
Williams presented her identification, but the 
negotiations took place between Tonia and 
the pawnbroker. 
Tonia was allowed to testify, over Smith's 
objection based on the spousal evidentiary 
privilege, that he told her he had a saxophone 
and asked her if she could persuade Belinda 
to pawn it. She also testified that he told her 
she could pick the saxophone up at St. 
Mark's and that he needed money. Tonia 
further testified that at first she just wanted 
to pawn her ring but that when she could not 
get enough money for it, she pawned the > 
saxophone instead. 
Smith's version of the facts was substanti-
ally different than Tonia's. He admitted he 
had had possession of the saxophone, but 
testified that Tonia had given it to him on 
December 26, 1982, and had asked him to 
hold it for her until the next day. This evid-
ence contradicted his testimony that he told 
Kearns, the St. Mark's supervisor, that he 
either had, or was supposed to have, played 
the saxophone at a performance in Ogden the 
previous weekend. 
The trial judge instructed -the jury, over 
Smith's objection, as follows (the first para-
graph being the language of §76-6-402(1)):
 ( „ 
Utah Law provides that: 
"Possession of property recently 
stolen when no satisfactory explana-
tion of such possession is made, shall 
be prima facie evidence that the , 
person in possession stole the proper- • 
ty." • •  - „ 
Thus, if you find from the evidence , . 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant was in possession of 
stolen property, that such possession , : 
was not too remote in point of time .; : 
from the theft, and the defendant 
made no satisfactory explanation of 
such possession, then you may infer 
from those facts that the defendant 
committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if 
you find it justified by the evidence, 
to connect the possessor of recently 
stolen property, with the offense of 
burglary. . , . , . , . . 
• I . 
On appeal, Smith argues that §76-6-
402(1) is unconstitutional because it imposes 
a statutory presumption of guilt that is not 
rational and therefore is a violation of due 
process under Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 
463 (1943), arid Leary v. United States, 395 
U.S. 6 (1969). He claims that his convictions 
were based solely on the statutory presump-
tion and that they therefore must be reversed. 
The defendant is in error. At the outset, we 
note that the ' statute, properly construed, 
does hot establish an evidentiary presump-
tion, let alone a presumption of guilt. State v. 
Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 326-27 (Utah 
1985). in Chambers, we held that a jury inst-
ruction using the language of §76-6-402(1) 
is unconstitutional because it "relieves the 
State of its burden of proof." Chambers, 709 
P.2d at 327. See also State v. Pacheco, 712 
P.2d 192 (Utah 1985). An instruction that 
simply incorporates the statutory language is 
unconstitutional when the statutory term * 
For cumulative UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS* see the second section of this issue. 
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prima facie" is defined as a presumption, as 
was the case in Chambers. Nevertheless, it is 
elementary that we read the language of an 
instruction in light of its immediate context 
and the context of the instructions as a 
whole. In the same instruction that incorpor-
ated the statutory language of §76-6-402(1), 
the trial court carefully stated that the statu-
tory language meant only that if the jury 
found certain facts that "you may infer from 
those facts that the defendant committed the 
theft." (Emphasis added.) The court also 
instructed the jury that it could infer a burg-
lary "if you find it justified by the evidence." 
Thus, the court explained that the statutory 
language incorporated in the instruction 
allowed only an inference of guilt, and then 
only if justified by the facts. Indeed, the 
court made the same point even more extens-
ively in a later instruction. ' 
We do not believe that the jury, in the face 
of these instructions, could have reasonably 
applied the instructions in an unconstitutional 
manner. 
Furthermore, the trial court explained to 
the jury that possession alone of a stolen 
object is not sufficient to support a convic-
tion, a rule that has been reiterated in nume-
rous opinions. In Stare v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d 
13, 15, 492 P.2d 978, 979 (1972), the Court 
stated: 
The mere possession of stolen 
property unexplained by the person in 
charge thereof is not in and of itself 
sufficient to justify a conviction of 
larceny of the property. It is, 
however, a circumstance to be consi-
' dered in connection with the other 
evidence in the case in the determina-
tion of the guilt or innocence of the 
possessor. Such possession is a circu-
mstance tending in some degree to 
show guilt, although it is not suffic-
ient, standing alone and unsupported 
by other evidence to warrant a convi-
ction. In addition to the proof of the 
larceny and of the possession by the 
defendant, there must be proof of 
corroborating circumstances tending 
of themselves to show guilt. Such 
corroborating circumstances may 
consist of the acts, conduct, falseh-
oods, if any, or other declarations, if 
any, of the defendant which tend to 
show his guilt. 
See also State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 621, 623 
(Utah 1983); State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 
641, 244 P.2d 653, 654 (1952); State v. Kins-
ey, 77 Utah 348, 352, 295 P. 247, 249 (1931). 
See also Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373 (11th 
Cir. 1982). 
Defendant's reliance on Tot v. United 
States, and Leary v. United States is misapp-
lied. As indicated, the instructions did not' 
permit the defendant to be convicted solely 
on the basis that he was in possession of 
stolen goods. There was, in fact, other evid-
ence that Smith stole the saxophone that a St. 
Mark's supervisor saw him with, and that" 
another St. Mark's supervisor saw the saxop-
hone with a piece of paper bearing Smith's 
name attached to it. Smith admitted having 
the saxophone in his possession immediately 
pric o the time it was pawned. His explan-
ation for his possession of the saxophone, 
that his wife asked him to hold it for her 
overnight, was inconsistent with her testi-
mony and with his own admission on the 
stand that he had told the St. Mark's superv-
isor that he had, or was to have, played the 
saxophone at a "gig" in Ogden the previous 
weekend. 2 Belinda Williams testified that 
Tonia told her Smith had something that he 
was going to let Tonia pawn and that the 
object picked up by Williams and Tonia from 
St. Mark's was a saxophone. In addition, 
Tonia testified that Smith told her that he 
had a saxophone, needed money, and wanted 
her to ask her friend Belinda to pawn it. 
There was sufficient corroborating evidence 
to support the necessary inference of guilt 
given the instructions and the evidence. 
Lest there be a misunderstanding of our 
ruling in this case, we emphatically declare 
that we do not retreat from Chambers. The 
trial court should not have used the statutory 
language in the instruction for the reasons 
stated in Chambers. We hold only that the 
instruction cannot be deemed reversible error 
in this case in light of the clear explanatory 
instructions that all that the jury could make 
of the term ''prima facie" was a permissible 
inference. 
II. 
Smith also claims that §76-6-402(1) forces 
a defendant to take the stand in violation of 
his Fifth Amendment right not to take the 
stand to testify. The United States Supreme 
Court and other state courts have held that 
the privilege is not violated by such a statute. 
E.g., Barnes v., United States, 412 U.S. 837, 
846-47 (1973); State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 
360, 251 A.2d 99, 110 (1969); Sfafe v! Cham-
bers, 709 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah 1985). See also 
Annot., 88 A.L.Rjd 1178 (1972); 1 Whart-
on's Criminal Evidence, §139, at 235 (1972). 
Smith's decision to testify to rebut the prose-
cution's case did not violate his Fifth Amen-
dment right. "Introduction of any evidence, 
direct or circumstantial, tending to implicate 
the defendant in the alleged crime, increases 
the pressure on him to testify. The mere 
massing of evidence against a defendant 
cannot be regarded as a violation of his priv-
ilege against self-incrimination/ Barnes v. 
For UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the second section of this issue. 
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United States, 412 U.S. at 847. 
III. 
Smith also argues that his wife's testimony 
was erroneously admitted because he had a 
right to prevent her from testifying pursuant 
to U.C.A., 1953, §78-24-8; which provides: 
There are particular relations in which 
it is the policy of the law to encourage 
confidence and to preserve it invio-
late. Therefore, a person cannot be 
examined as a witness in the following 
cases: (1) A husband cannot be 
examined for or against his wife 
without her consent, nor a wife for or 
against her husband without his 
consent; nor can either during the 
marriage or afterwards be, without 
the consent of the other, examined as 
to any communication made by one 
to the other during the marriage; but 
this exception does not apply ... 
where it is otherwise specifically 
provided by law.3 
In 1971, this Court promulgated Rules of 
Evidence pursuant to §78-2-4, which grants 
this Court power to promulgate, rules of 
procedure and evidence and which nullifies 
laws in conflict with such rules. 4 Rule 23(2) 
of those rules states: 
An accused in a criminal action has a 
privilege to prevent his spouse from 
testifying in such action with respect 
to any confidential communication 
had or made between them while they 
were husband and wife .... 
This rule provides a more limited privilege 
than that set forth in §78-24-8. Pursuant to 
§78-2-4, Rule 23(2) nullified §78-24-8 
insofar as it was inconsistent with Rule 23(2). 
See especially Rule 28(2)(e) quoted below. 
State v. Benson, 712 P.2d 256, 258 (Utah 
1985); State v. Bundy, 684 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 
1984). Smith therefore had no right under 
§78-24-8 to bar his wife from testifying, but 
did have the right under §78-24-8 and Rule 
23(2) to bar her from testifying about any 
confidential communications between them. 
Very little of Smith's wife's testimony 
concerned confidential communications with 
Smith. For example, her testimony that she 
obtained the saxophone from St. Mark's, 
where Smith lived, that she gave him money 
after pawning the instrument, and that she 
and Belinda in fact pawned it was not barred 
by the privilege. Her testimony as to any 
conversations between her and the defendant 
was to the effect that he told her he needed 
money and that he had a saxophone he 
wanted her to pawn. 
The trial judge ruled that the privilege was 
unavailable pursuant to Rule 28(2)(e), which 
states that neither spouse may claim the priv-
ilege '- s '" 
if the judge finds that sufficient evid-
ence, aside from the communication, 
has been introduced to warrant a 
finding that the communication was 
made; in whole or in part, to enable 
or aid anyone to commit or to plan to 
commit a crime or a tort. 
The evidence discussed above, aside from 
the confidential communications, was suffic-
ient in this case to justify a finding that the 
communications between Smith and his wife 
were made during the planning or commis-
sion of a crime. Therefore, even the more 
limited spousal evidentiary privilege was not 
available to Smith to bar, his wife's testi-
mony. 
IV. 
Smith's other claims are also without 
merit. He claims that testimony that he lived 
in a half-way house informed the jury of the 
fact that he had been convicted of a prior 
felony. Smith recognizes that under Rule 55 
"such evidence is admissible to prove some 
other material fact including absence of 
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or iden-
tity"; however, he claims that no special rele-
vance was demonstrated in this case. In addi-
tion, he claims that under Rule 45 the evid-
ence should have been excluded because its 
prejudice outweighed its probative value. 
Contrary to Smith's claim, the trial court 
only permitted parties and witnesses to refer 
to his residence as "St. Mark's." Except for 
Smith's own testimony, no other evidence 
indicated that St. Mark's was a half-way 
house. It was not until Smith took the stand 
that the jury heard that he had previously 
been convicted of a felony and that his resid-
ence was a half-way house. Even then, the 
judge gave an appropriate cautionary instru-
ction to the jury that the evidence could only 
be considered in assessing Smith's credibility. 
Clearly the trial judge dealt with the problem 
in a proper manner, and the claim of error 
has no substance. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
1. The Court also instructed: 
The mere fact that a person was in 
conscious possession of recently 
For cumulative UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, sec the second section of this issue. 
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stolen property is not sufficient to 
justify a conviction of theft. There 
must be proof of other circumstances 
tending of themselves to establish 
guilt. However, such proof need not 
be established by additional evidence 
or witnesses if you find that the 
pos se s s ion occur red under 
circumstances which warrants [sic] a 
finding of guilty. In this connection 
you may consider the defendant's 
conduct, any false or contradictory 
statements, and any other statements 
the defendant may have made with 
reference to the property. If the 
defendant gives a false account of 
how he acquired possession of stolen 
property this is a circumstance that 
may tend to show guilt. 
In the absence of evidence as to 
why the defendant was in possession 
of recently stolen property, you may 
infer that the defendant stole the 
property. 
2. This inconsistency is one of the sort of 
corroborating circumstances which warrant 
application of the statutory inference. State 
v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d at 15, 492 P.2d at 979. 
3. Smith does not claim a violation of the 
marital privilege set forth in Utah 
Constitution Article I, §12 and §77-1-
6(2)(b), which state: "A wife sshall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband nor 
a husband against his wife." 
4. The Rules of Evidence adopted in 1971 
were superseded by new rules of evidence 
which became effective September 1, 1983. 
However, the old rules were still in effect at 
the time of Smith's trial, and will therefore 
be applied in this case. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - P e t i t i o n e r , 
- v -
ROBERT PAUL PACHECO, 
D e f e n d a n t - R e s p o n d e n t . 
Case No. 20047 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTED IN PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s p e t i t i o n for 
r e h e a r i n g : 
1 . Did the Court misapply the holding of Franc i s v . 
Frankli l lr U.S. , 105 S. C t . 1965 (1985), as analyzed and 
appl ied in S t a t e v . Chambers. Utah, P.2d , Nos. 19151 and 
19152 ( f i l e d October 2 1 , 1985), t o the jury i n s t r u c t i o n 
concerning possess ion of r ecen t ly s t o l e n proper ty t h a t was given 
in the i n s t a n t case? 
2 . Did t h e Cour t i n c o r r e c t l y hold t h a t a d m i s s i o n of 
d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s t - a r r e s t e x p l a n a t i o n of h i s p o s s e s s i o n of a 
r e c e n t l y s t o l e n r i n g ( i . e . , n i t may have been t h e r e from a 
p r e v i o u s b u r g l a r y " ) was p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r because t h a t e v i d e n c e 
was o n l y r e l e v a n t t o show d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o p e n s i t y t o commit a 
c r ime? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendan t , R o b e r t Pau l Pacheco , was cha rged w i t h 
b u r g l a r y of a d w e l l i n g , a second d e g r e e f e l o n y , under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76 -6 -202 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . A j u r y found him g u i l t y as c h a r g e d . The 
c o u r t s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t t o t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n for a term of 
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one to fifteen years and fined him $5,000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State agrees with the fact statement set forth in 
the Court 's opinion in State v. Pacheco. Utah, P.2d , No. 
20047, s l i p op. at 1-2 (f i led October 21, 1985) (a copy of the 
full opinion i s contained in Appendix A), except for that portion 
re la t ing to the content of the jury ins t ruct ion concerning 
possession of recently stolen property that was given at t r i a l . 
I d . at 2-3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
By f a i l i n g t o consider the e n t i r e j u ry i n s t r u c t i o n 
regard ing u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y expla ined possess ion of r e c e n t l y 
s to l en p rope r ty , as wel l as other ju ry i n s t r u c t i o n given, the 
Court misappl ied Franc i s V, Frankl in in holding t h a t the 
possess ion i n s t r u c t i o n was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . 
In holding t h a t admission of evidence of de f endan t ' s 
p o s t - a r r e s t s ta tement exp la in ing h i s possess ion of a s t o l e n r ing 
was p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r , the Court f a i l e d to recognize the 
relevancy of t h i s evidence to the j u r y ' s de te rmina t ion of the 
g u i l t ques t ion and misappl ied the r e l e v a n t ru l e of evidence. 
INTRODUCTION 
in Brown Vt Pickflrtir denying reh'-a, 4 Utah, 292, U P . 
512 (1886) , th is Court set forth the standard for determining 
whether a pe t i t ion for rehearing should be granted: 
To jus t i fy a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that i t erred in i t s conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
- 2 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted). In Cummings v. 
Nielson, '42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Court stated: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result 
. . . . If there are some reasons, however, 
such as we have indicated above, or other 
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing 
should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of this 
brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the 
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and 
should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE HOLDING OF FRANCIS 
V, FRANKLIN, AS ANALYZED AND APPLIED IN S1A1E 
V. CHAMBERS. IN DECIDING THAT THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION CONCERNING POSSESSION OF RECENTLY 
STOLEN PROPERTY, GIVEN IN THE INSTANT CASE, 
WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In State v. Pacheco, Utah, P.2d , No. 20047 
(filed October 21, 1985) (see Appendix A), this Court held that, 
based upon its analysis and application of Francis v. Franklin, 
_ _ U.S. , 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985), in a companion case, State 
v. Chambers, Utah, P.2d , Nos. 19151 and 19152 (filed 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
October 21, 1985) , an instruction concerning possession of 
recently .stolen property was unconstitutional. Basic to the 
Court's decision was its observation that the instruction given 
was nothing more than a verbatim recitation of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-6-402(1) (1978) ,* something it found to be unconstitutional 
under Franklin in Chambers, slip op. at 6-7. However, the Court, 
for some unexplained reason, failed to consider the instruction 
in its entirety. Instruction No. 15 in whole read: 
The law of the state of Utah provides as 
follows: 
"Possession of property 
recently stolen, when no satis-
factory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be prima 
facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property." 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, (I) that the 
defendant was in possession of property, (II) 
that the property was stolen in a burglary, 
(III) that such possession was not too remote 
in point of time from the burglary, and (IV) 
that the defendant had made no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession, then you may 
find from those facts that the defendant 
committed the burglary in which such property 
was stolen and stole the property. 
(R. 129) . In deciding whether that instruction is unconstitu-
tional under Franklin, the Court must necessarily consider both 
paragraphs of the instruction, as well as other, instructions 
given to the jury« 
1 Section 76-6-402(1) provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property,, 
-4-
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The general question presented in Pacheco is the same 
as that presented in Chambers and Franklin: Did the jury 
instruction "have the effect of relieving the State of its burden 
of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential 
element of a crime." Franklin, 105 S. Ct. at 1970 (citations 
omitted). As stated in Franklin: 
The analysis is straightforward. "The 
threshold inquiry in ascertaining the 
constitutional analysis applicable to this 
kind of jury instruction is to determine the 
nature of the presumption it describes." 
Id.r at 514, 99 S.Ct., at 2454. The court 
must determine whether the challenged portion 
of the instruction creates a mandatory 
presumption, see id., at 520-524, 99 S.Ct., 
at 2457-2459, or merely a permissive 
inference, see Ulster County Court v. Allen, 
442 U.S. 140, 157-163, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-
2227, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). A mandatory 
presumption instructs the jury that it must 
infer the presumed fact if the State proves 
certain predicate facts. A permissive 
inference suggests to the jury a possible 
conclusion to be drawn if the State proves 
predicate facts, but does not require the 
jury to draw that conclusion. 
A permissive inference does not relieve the 
State of its burden of persuasion because it 
still requires the State to convince the jury 
that the suggested conclusion should be 
inferred based on the predicate facts proven. 
Such inferences do not necessarily implicate 
the concerns of Sandstrom. A permissive 
inference violates the Due Process Clause 
only if the suggested conclusion is not one 
that reason and common sense justify in light 
of the proven facts before the jury. Ulster 
County Court, Siipia, 442 U.S., at 157-163, 99 
S.Ct., at 2224-2227. 
Analysis must focus initially on the 
specific language challenged, but the inquiry 
does not end there> If a specific portion of 
the jury charge, considered in isolation, 
could reasonably have been understood as 
creating a presumption that relieves the 
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State of its burden of persuasion on an 
element of an offense, the potentially 
• offending words must be considered in the 
context of the charge as a whole. Other 
instructions might explain the particular 
infirm language to the extent that a 
reasonable juror could not have considered 
the charge to have created an unconstitu-
tional presumption. Cnpp v. Naughton, 414 
U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 
368 (1973). This analysis "requires careful 
attention to the words actually spoken to the 
jury . . . . for whether a defendant has been 
accorded his cons t i tu t ional r ights depends 
upon the way in which a reasonable juror 
could have interpreted the in s t ruc t ion . 
Sandstroro, supra, 442 U.S., at 514, 99 s . c t . , 
at 2545,. 
105 S.Ct. at 1971-72 (emphasis added). When t h i s analysis i s 
applied in assessing the va l id i ty of Ins t ruc t ion No. 15, i t 
becomes clear that a reasonable juror could only have understood 
that ins t ruc t ion to contain a val id permissive inference. F i r s t , 
although the f i r s t paragraph of the ins t ruc t ion , if considered in 
i so la t ion , could reasonably have been understood as creat ing a 
presumption tha t re l ieves the State of i t s burden of persuasion 
on the elements of burglary, when considered in the context of 
the ins t ruc t ion as a whole, a reasonable juror could not have 
considered that paragraph to have created an unconst i tut ional 
presumption. The second paragraph, which c lear ly is s tated in 
the form of a permissive inference, serves to explain the 
statement of law in the f i r s t paragraph. The words "shal l be 
deemed prima facie evidence" are not readily understandable to 
the average juror , and, in fact , probably are not pa r t i cu la r ly 
well understood by many lawyers, as i s evidenced by the confusion 
t h i s Court has experienced with the phrase. See Chambers, s l i p 
op. at 7-9. Therefore, a reasonable juror surely would have read 
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the second paragraph which, significantly, begins with the word 
"thus/ as explaining the statement of law in the first 
paragraph. No reasonable juror could have read Instruction No. 
15 as requiring a finding that defendant was guilty of burglary 
once he found beyond a reasonable doubt the enumerated predicate 
facts. Given the wording of the instruction and viewing it as a 
whole, a reasonable juror would have understood that he may, not 
must, find defendant guilty of burglary once satisfied that the 
predicate facts had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.2 This 
conclusion is further supported by examining other instructions 
that were given to the jury. Instruction No. 3 read: 
You are instructed that to the 
Information the defendant has entered a plea 
of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies 
each and all of the essential allegations of 
the charge contained in the Information and 
casts upon the State the burden of proving 
each and all of the essential allegations 
thereof to your satisfaction and beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
(R. 118) . Instruction No. 12 read in pertinent part: 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
2
 That the instruction's first paragraph is a verbatim recitation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-402(1) (1978) does not automatically 
render the instruction unconstitutional. And, the use of the 
term "prima facie" does not in itself require a finding that 
there is Franklin/SandstEOm error. £££ Chambers, slip op. at 7-8 
(noting cases where this Court held that although the use of the 
term prima facie in an instruction was improper, it was not 
prejudicial in light of other instructions given to the jury). 
Instruction No. 15 does nothing more than instruct the jury on a 
"traditional common-law inference deeply rooted in our law." 
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973). See also 
State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45-6 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Kirkham, 20 Utah 2d 44, 432 P.2d 63 8 (1967) (cases implicitly 
recognizing the validity of this common-law inference in the 
context of approving its use in burglary cases) . 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And 
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is 
entitled to an acquittal. 
(R. 126). Instruction No. 16 read: 
Before you can convict the defendant of 
the crime of Burglary of a Dwelling as 
charged in the Information on file in this 
case you must believe from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each 
and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 3rd day of 
June, 1983, at 443 East Vine Street, Murray, 
Utah the defendant, Robert Paul Pacheco, 
entered or remained in the dwelling of Masaji 
and Tsuruko Imai; and 
2. That said defendant did so 
unlawfully; and 
3. That said defendant did so with the 
intent to commit a theft. 
If you are not convinced that the 
evidence establishes each and all of the 
essential elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the 
defendant not guilty. If, on the other hand, 
you are convinced of the truth of each and 
every one of the foregoing elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt then you must find the 
defendant guilty of Burglary as charged by 
the Information on file in this case. 
(R. 130). And, perhaps of most significance, was Instruction No. 
18, which stated: 
If in these instructions any rule, 
direction or idea has been stated in varying 
ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and 
none must be inferred by you. For that 
reason, you are not to single out any certain 
sentence, or any individual point or 
instruction and ignore the othersi but you 
are to consider all the instructions as a 
whole, and to regard each in the light of all 
the others. 
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The order in which the instructions are 
given has no significance as to their 
relative importance, * 
(R. 132) (emphasis added). 
Second, Instruction No. 15 contains an acceptable 
permissive inference given that "the suggested conclusion is, . • 
one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven 
facts before the jury." Franklinf 105 S.Ct. at 191. The Supreme 
Court made this clear in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 
(1973), which held that an instruction on the common-law 
inference of guilty knowledge from the unexplained possession of 
recently stolen property satisfied the requirements of due 
process. Id. at 841-46. £ee also State v. Sessions; State v. 
Kirkham (supray at fn. 2). 
Significantly, the Pacheco instructions do not have the 
problems identified by the Court in the instructions it found to 
be unconstitutional in Chambers. There, the verbatim recitation 
of § 76-6-402(1) appeared alone, without the explanatory 
paragraph included in Pacheco Instruction No. 15. Chambers
 f slip 
op. at 4. Furthermore, in Chambers a separate instruction 
defined the term prima facie in such a way that it "could well 
have indicated to a juror that the defendants were required to 
disprove guilt"—a defect that could not be cured by another 
instruction that restated the presumption in permissive form. 
Id. at 6-7. 
In sum, Instruction No. 15 survives the 
Franklin/Sandstrom analysis. In applying Franklin, as analyzed 
and applied in Chambers. to the instant case, the Court failed to 
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t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s in t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s 
a t i s s u e i n Chambers and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n a d d r e s s e d h e r e * 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e Cour t a r r i v e d a t a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a p p e a r s t o 
be c o n t r a r y t o t h e law e x p r e s s e d i n F r a n k l i n and Chambers , 
THE COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT THE ADMISSION 
OF TESTIMONY CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S POST- -
ARREST EXPLANATION FOR HIS POSSESSION OF THE 
STOLEN RING WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR, 
Pacheco h e l d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t commit ted p r e j u d i c i a l 
e r r o r i n a l l o w i n g " D e t e c t i v e Anderson t o t e s t i f y d u r i n g t h e 
S t a t e 1 s case i n ch i e f t h a t d e f e n d a n t had s t a t e d i n r e s p o n s e t o a 
q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g the o r i g i n of t h e r i n g f ' [ l i t may have been 
t h e r e from a p r e v i o u s b u r g l a r y . 1 " S l i p op, a t 3 . I n a r r i v i n g a t 
t h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h e Cour t r e a s o n e d t h a t f b e c a u s e t h e i n f e r e n c e 
s e t out i n § 76 -6 -402(1 ) i s a d d r e s s e d on ly t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t for 
d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e S t a t e ha s e s t a b l i s h e d a pr ima f a c i e c a s e f 
t h e p o s t - a r r e s t s t a t e m e n t of d e f e n d a n t , who d i d n o t t a k e t h e 
s t a n d a t t r i a l t o o f f e r an e x p l a n a t i o n for p o s s e s s i o n of t h e 
r i n g , shou ld no t have been p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y . Even w i t h o u t 
t h a t e v i d e n c e " t h e t r i a l j u d g e would have been j u s t i f i e d i n 
assuming t h a t a pr ima f a c i e case of b u r g l a r y had been made out 
a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t . " Pacheco , s l i p o p . 4 . T h e r e f o r e , i n t he 
C o u r t ' s v iew f because t h e ev idence of d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t , 
which included an admission of a prior crime, was "in no way . . 
. relevant to prove a specific element of the crime of burglary" 
and went only to show defendant's propensity to commit crime, its 
admission was prejudicial error. IhL&. This ruling fails to 
recognize the relevancy of the challenged evidence to prove 
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defendant's gu i l t and re f l ec t s a c r i t i c a l misapplication of the 
rules of evidence. 
F i r s t , the t r i a l cou r t ' s determination of whether a 
prima facie case has been established under § 76-6-402(1) and the 
j u r y ' s determination of the gu i l t question are two en t i re ly 
di f ferent functions. Although the Court correct ly concluded that 
defendant 's statement, in l igh t of his fa i lu re to offer any 
explanation of his possession of the ring at t r i a l , was not 
necessary for sa t i s fac t ion of the prima facie evidence standard 
applied by the t r i a l court, i t incorrect ly concluded that the 
evidence was not a t a l l relevant to the issue of gu i l t presented 
to the jury . The Court 's applicat ion of Chambers in t h i s regard 
strongly suggests tha t jury consideration of unexplained or 
unsa t i s fac tor i ly explained possession of recently stolen 
property, and the inference of gu i l t that may be drawn from that 
circumstance, i s improper. Such a conclusion is contrary to 
established law. £g£. Barnes v. United States/ 412 U.S. 837 
(1973) .3 A jury may lawfully and reasonably draw an inference of 
gu i l t from possession of recently stolen property when no 
sa t is factory explanation of that possession is given. 
"Possession of recently stolen property is nothing more than a 
circumstantial b i t of evidence in a case of burglary . . . ." 
State v. Kirk.ham, 20 Utah 2d at 44, 43 2 P.2d at 638. &££ also 
3 The error in t h i s conclusion i s fully discussed in the S t a t e ' s 
pe t i t ion for rehearing in State v. Chambers. The S t a t e ' s 
argument there i s incorporated by reference here (see Appendix 
B) . 
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S t a t e v . Sess ions , 583 P.2d a t 4 5 - 6 . 4 
Second, the Court appears to have misappl ied Utah R. 
Evid. 404(b) (Supp. 1985) 5 in holding t h a t de f endan t ' s s ta tement 
was inadmiss ib le because i t was not r e l e v a n t to prove a s p e c i f i c 
element of burg la ry and was r e l evan t only t o show d e f e n d a n t ' s 
p ropens i ty to commit a c r ime. See Pacheco f s l i p op. a t 4 . Rule 
404(b) p r o v i d e s : 
Other cr imes, wrongs, or a c t s . Evidence 
of other cr imes , wrongs or a c t s i s not 
admiss ib le to prove the cha rac te r of a person 
in order to show t h a t he ac ted in conformity 
t he r ewi th . I t may, however, be admiss ib le 
for other purposes , such as proof of motive, 
oppor tun i ty , i n t e n t , p r e p a r a t i o n , p lan , 
knowledge, i d e n t i t y , or absence of mistake or 
a c c i d e n t . 
Like former Utah R. Evid. 55 (1977), Rule 404(b) i s i n c l u s i o n a r y : 
"evidence of other crimes or c i v i l wrongs t h a t i s competent and 
r e l evan t t o prove some ma te r i a l f a c t , o ther than to show merely 
the genera l d i s p o s i t i o n of the defendant/ i s a d m i s s i b l e . " S t a t e 
v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983) (emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) . 
See a lso United S t a t e s v . Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708 (9th C i r . 
1982), c e r t , denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983). 
4
 Under t h i s a n a l y s i s , p r e s e n t a t i o n by the S t a t e of evidence of a 
de fendan t ' s p r e t r i a l exp lana t ion for possess ion of r ecen t ly 
s t o l e n proper ty i s not r e s t r i c t e d to those cases where the 
defendant takes the stand and o f fe r s a cont rary e x p l a n a t i o n . A 
de f endan t ' s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y explana t ion i s most a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
presented as c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence in the S t a t e ' s c a s e - i n -
ch ie f . £££. Barnes, 412 U.S. a t 839 Sess ions , 583 P.2d a t 44 
(defendants1 exp lana tory s ta tements admit ted in government 's 
c a s e - i n - c h i e f ) . 
5 The cur ren t ru l e s of evidence were in e f fec t a t the time of 
de fendan t ' s t r i a l . 
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The S t a t e offered de fendan t ' s s tatement only as 
c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence of h i s g u i l t of burg la ry ( i . e . , as 
evidence of a lack of l ega l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for possess ion of the 
r ing and an i n a b i l i t y to exp la in s a t i s f a c t o r i l y t h a t p o s s e s s i o n ) , 
see Sess ions . 583 P.2d a t 45-6 (approving of an inference of 
g u i l t from these c i rcumstances in burglary c a s e s ) ; i t was not 
offered to show d e f e n d a n t ' s p ropens i ty to commit a crime (R. 407-
11 ; Appendix C). Defendant v o l u n t a r i l y gave h i s exp lana t ion 
about a p r io r burg la ry to the po l ice o f f i ce r a f t e r being a r r e s t e d 
and a f t e r r ece iv ing a Miranda warning (R. 40-8; Appendix C) . 
As an i n i t i a l ma t t e r , the evidence of other misconduct 
contained in de fendan t ' s vo lun ta ry s tatement should not be viewed 
as " e x t r i n s i c " evidence for purposes of Rule 404(b ) . Because the 
evidence of the p r io r burglary was i n e x t r i c a b l y in t e r twined with 
the evidence used t o prove the crime charged, i t was admis s ib l e . 
United S t a t e s v. McCrary, 699 F.2d 1308, 1311 (11th C i r . 1983) 
( in prosecut ion for a id ing and a b e t t i n g i n t r o d u c t i o n of drugs in 
federa l p r i son , evidence of other a c t s of dea l ing in drugs in 
pr i son held " i n e x t r i c a b l y in te r twined" with evidence used to 
prove crime cha rged) . See g e n e r a l l y 2 J . Weinstein & M. Berger, 
W e i n s t e i n ' s Evidence § 404110] a t 77-9 (1985). £ £ . United S t a t e s 
v. Blanton . 730 F.2d 1425, 1432 (11th C i r . 198.4) (evidence of 
other wrongdoing a t time of a r r e s t of defendant not inadmiss ib le 
under Rule 404(b) because t h a t evidence was "par t of the X£LS 
ges tae of the o f f e n s e " ) . Evidence of de f endan t ' s explana t ion was 
c r i t i c a l to the S t a t e ' s ca se ; and, i nc lus ion of de fendan t ' s 
reference to a pr ior burg la ry was e s s e n t i a l to the j u r y ' s 
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understanding of the explanation and i t s assessment of whether 
the explanation was sa t i s fac to ry . 
Even if Rule 404(b) is applicable f the t r i a l court 
properly admitted defendants statement. Essen t ia l ly , a two-step 
t e s t must be met for admission under that ru le : (1) "the 
evidence of an ex t r in s i c offense must be relevant to an issue 
other than the defendant 's bad charac ter ," and (2) " i t s probative 
value must not be subs tan t ia l ly outweighed by undue prejudice to 
the defendant." United States v. Punch, 722 F.2d 146f 153 (5th 
Cir . 1983) (c i ta t ion omitted). Defendant's statement obviously 
was relevant to show that he had no legal j u s t i f i c a t i o n for 
possession of the ring and could not give a sa t i s fac tory 
explanation for his possession of i t . Moreover, the statement 
was relevant to iden t i ty and in t en t . In short , the evidence 
ass is ted the jury in understanding the circumstances, and i t s 
probative value was not outweighed by the possible prejudice to 
defendant. £££. ZunjLhr 722 F.2d at 153. 
In conclusion, the following comment by Professor 
Ronald Boyce on th i s part of the Pacheco opinion i s pa r t i cu la r ly 
i n s t ruc t i ve : 
[T]he Court 's ruling on the 
admiss ibi l i ty of defendant's admission i s 
wrong in t h i s w r i t e r ' s opinion. The Court 
confuses the value of the evidence as to the 
S t a t e ' s burden to make out a prima facie case 
with the S t a t e ' s burden to prove gui l t to the 
sa t i s fac t ion of the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The question i s whether the 
defendant 's admission has any relevance to 
prove his gu i l t , as d i s t i n c t from merely 
showing bad character . The admission could 
be interpreted by the jury as showing 
defendant had no legal j u s t i f i c a t i on for 
possession of the ring and could not make a 
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r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n as t o why t h e r i n g was 
in d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s s e s s i o n . Th i s e v i d e n c e , 
. a l t h o u g h u n n e c e s s a r y t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
a prima f a c i e case by t h e t r i a l j u d g e , i s 
r e l e v a n t t o t h e j u r y ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
g u i l t . F u r t h e r , t h e Cour t i s wrong in s ay ing 
b e f o r e t h e ev idence i s a d m i s s i b l e i t must 
"prove a s p e c i f i c e lement of t he c r i m e . " The 
e v i d e n c e t o be a d m i s s i b l e under Rule 5 5 , 
U . R . E . , 1971 , or Rule 4 0 4 ( b ) , U . R . E . , 1 9 8 3 , 
need on ly have been r e l e v a n t t o any i s s u e i n 
the case o t h e r than bad c h a r a c t e r . I f t h e -
ev idence was more p r e j u d i c i a l t han r e l e v a n t , 
i t should have been e x c l u d e d under Rule 4 5 , 
U . R . E . , 1 9 7 1 , or Rule 4 0 3 , U . R . E . , 1 9 8 3 . By 
t y i n g t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e a d m i s s i o n t o 
t h e i s s u e of "prima f a c i e " c a se for t h e t r i a l 
j u d g e , t h e Supreme Cour t has c r e a t e d an 
e r r o n e o u s , r e s t r i c t i v e , and m i s c o n c e i v e d 
s t a n d a r d of a d m i s s i b i l i t y t h a t w i l l come back 
t o haun t i t . Any knowledgeab le de fense 
c o u n s e l w i l l use t h i s case t o a rgue t h a t 
ev idence of o t h e r m i s c o n d u c t , u n n e c e s s a r y t o 
e s t a b l i s h i n g t he p r o s e c u t i o n ' s pr ima f a c i e 
c a s e , i s i n a d m i s s i b l e . Th i s i s no t t h e 
p r o p e r l e g a l s t a n d a r d for a d m i s s i b i l i t y of 
such e v i d e n c e . 
I n t e r m o u n t a i n Commercial Record , Nov. 1 , 1 9 8 5 , a t 2 4 , c o l . 1 . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n , i t a p p e a r s t h a t 
t h e Cour t i n S t a t e v . P a c h e c o . misapprehended s i g n i f i c a n t case 
law in c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n r e g a r d i n g 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e x p l a i n e d p o s s e s s i o n of r e c e n t l y s t o l e n p r o p e r t y 
was t unconstitutional. Also, the Court applied a wrong principle 
of law in holding that the tr ial court committed prejudicial 
error when i t admitted evidence of defendant's post-arrest 
statement explaining his possession of a stolen ring. Therefore, 
the State's petition for rehearing should be granted and the 
instant case should be restored to the calendar for reargument or 
resubmission. See Utah R. App. P. 35(c) (1985). Alternatively, 
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the Court should modify its opinion to reflect a proper 
application of Franklin v. Francis and Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for purposes of delay. ,*^ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _^_day of November, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
/Ud^-cJLj ^D- \y%L<ryy&**-^ 
DAVID B. THOMPSON {/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING. 
I hereby certify that four true and exact copies of the 
foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed to Sumner J. Hatch, 
Attorney for Defendant, 72 East 400 South, Suite 330, Salt Lake 
/ ^ t 
City, Utah 84111, this V day of November, 1985. 
<uh^*L d5. ^Ttey^s^rsA^ 
-16-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM C 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
jm-
»* 
INSTRUCTION NO. > $ 
The mere fact that a person was in conscious possession 
of recently stolen property is not sufficient to justify a con-
viction of theft. There must be proof of other circumstances 
tending of themselves to establish guilt. However, such proof 
need not be established by additional evidence or witnesses if 
you find that the possession occurred under circumstances which 
warrants a finding of guilty. In this connection you may con-
sider the defendant's conduct, any false or contradictory state-
ments, and any other statements the defendant may have made with 
reference to the property. If the defendant gives a false account 
of how he acquired possession of stolen property this is a circum-
stance that may tend to show guilt. 
In the absence of evidence as to why the defendant was in 
possession of recently stolen property, you may infer that the 
defendant stole the property. 
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